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I. INTRODUCTION

Only since 1950 has the issue of delimitation of the territorial
sea been regarded separately by scholars. Before this time, attention centered (with a few worthy exceptions) 1 around the question
of determining the extension of the territorial sea. 2 What brought
this delicate issue to the notice of scholars was the rise of an international controversy over the delimitation of Norway's territorial
waters. Norway broke away from the customary practice of the day,
which was to use the low-water line as the base-line for measuring
territorial waters. 3 Instead, Norway established by Royal Decree
of July 12, 1935 that the baseline for Norwegian territorial waters
was to consist of baselines drawn between selected points along
the coast. The Norwegian Decree was based on firmly established
national entitlements, geographical conditions predominating on the
Norwegian coast, and the protection of the vital interests of her
inhabitants. 4 The length of these lines differed according to the coast
and, in several places, exceeded forty miles.
The adoption of the Royal Decree produced violent protests,
particularly from the United Kingdom. After several incidents, the
United Kingdom brought the controversy before the International

• This article has been written in conjunction with a research project sponsored
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•• Diploma in International Law, Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento, University of Pisa (Italy).
1. See s. DE BUSTAMANTE y SIRVEN, LA MER TERRITORIALE 159 (1930); G. GIDEL, 3 LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER, LES TEMPS DE PAIX (1930); G. GIDEL. LA MER TER
RITORIAL ET LA ZONE CONTIQUE 493 (1934).
2. See P. BALDONI, IL MARE TERRITORIALE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE COMUNE (1934);
Tenekides, Le Conflict des Limites de la Mer Territorial entre L 'Etat Riverain et un Etat
Tiers, 64 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL [J. DR. INT.] 673 (1937); F. FLORIO, IL MARE TERRITORIALE E LA SUA DELIMITAZIONE (1947).
3. See p .c. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL wATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 66
(1927).
4. For a translation of the Norwegian Royal Decree of 1935 see Application Instituting
Proceedings (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (1 Fisheries Case) 14 (Application dated Sept.
24, 1949).

377
Published by SURFACE, 1984

1

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1984], Art. 8

378

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 11 :377

Court of Justice, to ascertain whether the method used by Norway
in 1935 to fix her baselines was in conformity with international
law. The International Court of Justice determined that as long as
certain conditions were respected, the method employed by the
Royal Norwegian Decree of 1935 was not contrary to international
law. 5
The Court also established the following principles by which
a state whose coasts are deeply indented and cut into may adopt
straight baselines. First, the baseline must follow the general direction of the coast. Second, there must be a close dependence of the
territorial sea on the land domain. 6
The conclusions of the International Court of Justice were
accepted into practice in 1958 at the Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958 Geneva Convention).
Article 3 of this Convention affirms that "[t]he normal baseline for
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line
along the coast." Article 4 adds that "[i]n localities where the coast
line is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands
along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured."
From then on the system of straight baselines was adopted
by an increasingly vast number of states. 7 Articles 5 and 7 of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the 1982
Convention) confirms this trend in the international community.
These Articles repeat the content of Articles 3 and 4 of the 1958
Geneva Convention, with slight differences in the wording. 8
5. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 143 (Judgment of Dec. 18) [hereinafter
cited as Fisheries Case]. See Waldock, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 114 (1951); Evensen, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Ca.se and Its Legal Consequences,
46 AM. J. INT'L L. 609 (1952); Johnson, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 145 (1952); Parfond, L 'Affaire Angln-Norvegienne des Pecheries, 71 REVUE MARITIME 346
(1952); Auby, Problems of Territorial Waters Before the International Court of Justice, 80 J.
DR. INT. 25 (1953); C.J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 144 (4th ed. 1967).
6. Fisheries Case, supra note 5, at 133.
7. In the Mediterranean, for example, as many as eleven states have adopted the
straight baseline system. See infra text accompanying notes 51-112.
8. The outstanding difference is the addition in Article 7 of the 1982 Convention of
a paragraph not found in the corresponding article, Article 4, of the 1958 Geneva Convention. Article 7(4) of the 1982 Convention reads:
2. Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the
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State practice, jurisprudence and relevant international conventions provide three systems for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea. The first system involves the low-water line along
the coast. The second system involves straight baselines but only
in localities where the coast is deeply indented and cut into, or
where there is a fringe of islands along the coast in the immediate
vicinity. The third system involves a combination of the two abovementioned methods. 9
The use of straight baselines must obey certain rules, the most
important of which is that the drawing of these lines "must not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the
coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters." 1° Furthermore, the system of straight baselines
"may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut off the
territorial sea of another State from the high seas or from an
coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, the straight baselines shall remain effective until changed
by the coastal state in accordance with this convention.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 7(4), opened for si9nature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21I.L.M.1261, 1272 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as 1982 Convention].
Although it is largely accepted that the rules of the 1958 Geneva Convention related
to "historic bays" have become international customary rules, it is interesting to recall which
Mediterranean states have ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N .T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea]. These states, as of December 31, 1981, were: Israel, Italy, Malta, Spain and
Yugoslavia. Tunisia signed the Convention but did not ratify it. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES
DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. STATUS AS AT 31DECEMBER1982 609 (1983). The 1982
Convention, which largely repeats the contents of the corresponding rules of the 1958 Convention, was passed in the U.N. General Assembly, with affirmative votes Algeria, Cyprus,
Egypt, France, Greece, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and
Yugoslavia. Italy and Spain abstained, while Israel and Turkey voted against passage of
the Convention. Albania did not vote. See U.N. CHRON. No. 6 13 (1982).
9. This last method has been expressly provided for in Article 14 of the 1982 Convention, supra note 8, art. 14, while in the 1958 Geneva Convention there is no corresponding rule. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8. It seems, however, that a
systematic reading of relevant rules of the 1958 Convention leads to the same conclusion.
Where there are special geographical conditions, a state is entitled to utilize either the lowwater line system (where the coastline is fairly regular) or the straight baseline system (for
those parts of the coastline which are deeply indented and cut into). See 1958 Convention
on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8.
10. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 4(2); 1982 Convention, supra note 8, art. 7(3).
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exclusive economic zone." 11 Particular rules also govern the use of
the straight baselines in the presence of river mouths, 12 bays, 13
ports, 1' roadsteads, 15 and low-tide elevations. 16
Both the baseline systems of the 1958 Geneva Convention and
the 1982 U.N. Convention are based on a concept previously
articulated by the International Court of Justice in the 1951
Fisheries Case. The Fisheries Case holds that where the method of
straight baselines is applicable, "account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the
region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly
evidenced by long usage." 11 Similarly, as it is often also held that
third states have a particular interest in knowing whether a state
has used the straight baseline system, due publicity must be given
to charts indicating the location of a states' baselines.18
Some states bordering on the Mediterranean have adopted the
system of straight baselines, but have left the actual drawing of
baselines to a later date. 19 In some cases these measures have still
not been taken. What, then, are the consequences of the failure to
adopt specific baselines? It is this author's opinion that in such circumstances, third states are entitled to consider the low-water line

11. 1982 Convention, supra note 8, art. 7(6). The content of Article 4(5) of the 1958
Geneva Convention is quite similar. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8,
art. 4(5).
12. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 13; 1982 Convention,
supra note 8, art. 9.
13. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 7; 1982 Convention, supra
note 8, art. 10.
14. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 8; 1982 Convention, supra
note 8, art. 11.
15. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 9; 1982 Convention, supra
note 8, art. 12.
16. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 13; 1982 Convention,
supra note 8, art. 13.
17. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 4(4); 1982 Convention,
supra note 8, art. 7(5).
18. Article 16(2) of the 1982 Convention requests, furthermore, that the coastal state
deposit a copy of such chart or a list of geographical coordinates with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. 1982 Convention, supra note 8, art. 16(2).
19. See, e.g., the legislation of Morocco, infra note 34. On other occasions, the exact
location of the baselines is drawn directly on to large-scale maps which are duly publicized
for the benefit of those concerned. This duty to give appropriate publicity to nautical maps
is fundamental in that it enables anyone using the sea to recognize, precisely, the different
maritime boundaries.
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as the normal baseline. In fact, both the 1958 Geneva Convention
and the 1982 Convention consider the low-water line as the normal
baseline, while the straight baseline method may be invoked only
in special circumstances. Relying on the low-water mark seems to
be the only reasonable alternative, since in no other way can third
states be sure of the exact external limit of the territorial sea of
the state concerned.20 It is precisely for this reason that this paper
will examine both the legislation of states which have in theory
adopted the straight baseline system, but which have not yet fixed
them officially, and the legislation of states which have adopted the
low-water line system.21
The question of the extension of the territorial sea, which has
been controversial for some time, also requires some comment.
Today, the original limit of three miles has been extended by some
states to as much as 200 miles. 22 As a result of these conflicting
positions, it was impossible to establish any rule concerning the
breadth of the territorial sea at the 1958 Geneva Convention. In
recent years, however, international practice has become more
uniform. For example, at the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, it was unanimously agreed that "[e]very State
has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to
a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles." 23
The situation regarding territorial seas in the Mediterranean Sea
is also rather complex. Syria has thirty-five miles of territorial waters, 24

20. "Un systeme de lignes droites qui n'est pas connu manque, en effect, de la notoriete
requise pour pouvoir invoquer une tolerance et une reconnaissance de la part des autre Etats."
Voelckel, Les Lignes de Base dans la Convention de Geneve sur la Mer Territoriale, XIX
ANNUAIRE FRAN<;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [AN. FR. DR. INT.) 830 (1973). A like theory is also
based on some important statements made by the International Court of Justice in the 1951
Fisheries Case. See Fisheries Case, supra note 5, at 138-39.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 51-75.
22. According to the U.S. Department of State, by 1981 there were already 13 states
claiming a territorial sea of 200 miles. U.S. DEPT OF STATE. BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND
RESEARCH, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 36 (4th ed.1981) [hereinafter cited as LIMITS IN THE SEAS).
See 3 OCEAN Y.B. 564 (1982).
23. According to the U.S. Department of State, by 1981, 87 states had fixed the extension of their territorial seas up to 12 miles. See LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 22, No. 36
(1981).
24. See Syrian Law No. 37 (1981), which defines the Syrian Arab Republic's territorial
waters, reprinted in v FOREIGN BROADCASTING INFORMATION SERVICE DAILY REPORTS (Middle
East and Africa) No.174, at H-1(Sept.9, 1981). Law No. 37 (1981) amended Legislative Decree
No. 304 (1963) concerning th('. territorial sea of the Syrian Arab Republic.
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Albania, fifteen, 25 Algeria,26 Cyprus, 27 Egypt, 28 France,29 Italy, 30 Libya, 31
Malta,32 Monaco,33 Morocco,34 Spain,35 Tunisia36 and Yu gos la via37 all have
25. See Decree No. 4650 of March 9, 1970 on the boundary of the People's Republic
of Albania, as amended by Decree No. 5384 of February 23, 1976, reprinted in VII NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE LA w OF THE SEA 1 (M. Nordquist, s. Houston & K.R. Simmonds eds. 1980).
The text of the 1979 Decree is reprinted in 12 WGO, MONATSHEFTE OSTEUROPAISCHES RECHT
309 (1970). The justification for the decision to extend the territorial sea up to 15 miles can
be deduced from the following statement given by the Albanian delegate during the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: "Since the two Super-Powers were traversing the Mediterranean and the Adriatic like sea monsters, Albania was going to reconsider
the breadth of its territorial waters beyond the 12-mile limit." I THIRD UNITED NATIONS CON·
FERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 100 (1975) [hereinafter cited as I UN CLOS
III OFFICIAL RECORDS (1975)). The 1976 unilateral decision by Albania has been criticized as
"a violation of the existing law of the sea." See Ibler, The Changing Law of the Sea as Affecting the Adriatic, 20 GER. Y .B. INT'L L. 178 (1977).
26. See Decree No. 63-403 of October 12, 1963 which sets the limit of the territorial
sea, reprinted in 1 REVUE ALGERIENNE DES SCIENCE JURDIQUES, POLITIQUES ET ECONOMIC
[R.ALGER.S.JR.POL.EC.J 134 (1964).
27. Territorial Sea Law No. 45 of August 6, 1964, reprinted in WESTERN EUROPE AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 5 (F. Durante & w. Rodino eds.1980). It is worth
remembering that when Cyprus became independent in 1960, the United Kingdom retained,
as sovereign British territory, certain base areas on the island. Agreement concerning Crown
Properties in the Sovereign Base Areas, done Aug. 16, 1960, 382 U.N.T.S. 207 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Treaty Concerning Cyprus]. These non-ceded lands did not pass to the
new state. The boundaries of the territorial sea of Cyprus and those of the U.K. base area
were also decided by the Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.
Id. at 208. The territorial sea of the base areas was set at a breadth of 3 miles, whereas
the territorial sea of the Republic of Cyprus was set at 12 miles. Id. at 208. See infra text
accompanying note 163. On the other hand, it is not known if the Turkish Republic of North
Cyprus approved special rules concerning the territorial waters adjacent to its coast.
28. Royal Decree of January 15, 1951 concerning the territorial waters of the Kingdom
of Egypt, reprinted in VI REVUE EQYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.EGYPT.DR.INT.] 175
(1950). This Decree was modified by Presidential Decree No. 180 of February 17, 1958,
reprinted in XIV R.EGYPT.DR.INT. 406 (1958).
29. Law No. 71-1060 of December 24, 1971 relating to the delimitation of the French
territorial sea, reprinted in Queneudec, Chronique sur le Droit de la Mer, IV Mer Territoriale:
La Loi Fram;aise du 24 Decembre 1971, XVII AN.FR.DR.INT. 759 (1971); Rousseau, Chronique
des Fait Internationaux, 76 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G.DR.INT.P.J
1028 (1975); Rodriguez, Le Droit Administratij de la Mer Territoriale, 35 LE DROIT MARITIME
FRANCAIS (DR.M.FR.) 323, 387, 451 (1983).
30. Law No. 359 of February 18, 1974 modifying Article 2 of the Navigation Code,
258 GAzz. UFF. ITAL. (Aug. 21, 1974) translation reprinted in 1 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 332 (1975).
31. Act No. 2 of February 18, 1959 concerning the delimitation of Libyan territorial
waters, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND
TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Doc. No. ST!LEG/SER.B/16, at 14 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1974)).
32. Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Act of 1971, as amended in 1978, reprinted
in WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LA w OF THE SEA. supra note 27, at 13. The
1978 amendment is reprinted in UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES. NATIONAL LEGISLATION
AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19, at 63 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1980)).
33. Ordonnance Souveraine No. 5.094 of February 14, 1973 concerning the delimita-
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a twelve mile limit. Greece,38 Israel39 and Turkey'° have a six mile limit.
tion of the territorial sea of Monaco, reprinted in WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LA w OF THE SEA. supra note 27' at 5.
34. Law No. 1-73-211of26 Moharrem 1393 (1973) concerning the delimitation of the territorial sea and exclusive fishing zone of Morocco, reprinted in XII ANNUAIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD (AN.AFR.N.) 894 (1973).
35. Act No. 10 (1977) concerning the territorial sea, reprinted in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
THE LA w OF THE SEA. supra note 25, at 62.
36. Law No. 73-49 of August 2, 1973 concerning the delimitation of the territorial sea,
reprinted in XII AN.AFR.N. 1004 (1973).
37. Law No. 13 (1979) of March 27, 1979, amending the Law of May 22, 1965, concerning the coastal sea zone, the external sea belt, and the epicontinental belt of Yugoslavia,
reprinted in II YUGOSLAV LA w 102 (1979). The law of May 22, 1965 is reprinted in I NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LA w OF THE SEA (1973), supra note 25, at 35.
38. Law No. 230 of September 17, 1936, reprinted in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA. supra note 25, at 15. The breadth of the Greek territorial sea extends to 10 miles for
special purposes. See Law No. 4141 of March 26, 1913 concerning passage and sojourn of
merchant vessels along the Greek shores and the policing of ports and harbors in time of
war, reprinted in id. at 1. See also the Law of June 13, 1931 to regulate civil aviation, reprinted
in id. at 7; Law of September 18, 1931 to define the extent of territorial waters for the
purpose of navigation and the control thereof, reprinted in id. at 9. It is interesting that
the Greek delegate affirmed, during UNCLOS III that, "where the territorial sea was concerned, [his] delegation supported a uniform breadth of 12 nautical miles." I UNCLOS III
OFFICIAL RECORDS (1975), supra note 25, at 129.
39. Territorial Waters Law of 1956, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES
(1974), supra note 31, at 26. During the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Israeli
delegate stated that, "(i]t was obvious that, from the standpoint of territorial security, a
zone of control subject to the absolute sovereignty of the coastal State, was a necessity,
but a territorial sea of six nautical miles was sufficient for that purpose." I UNCLOS III
OFFICIAL RECORDS (1975), supra note 25, at 151. He added, nevertheless, that his government
would support the general trend in favor of a 12-mile limit "only if it was definitively and
generally accepted." Id.
At this point it seems necessary to briefly examine the delicate problem of the territorial sea of the Gaza Strip. This territory, though occupied by Eiypt, was never annexed
by Egypt nor has it been officially annexed by Israel. According to Glassner & Unger, Israel's
Maritime Boundaries, 1 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 305 (1973-74), this means that the Gaza Strip
is juridically "still part of the Palestine Mandate and its territorial sea remains three nautical
miles wide." Id. Cf. Ordinance No. 6 of 1937 to Regulate Fisheries, reprinted in 1 GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE. ORDINANCES. REGULATIONS. RULES AND NOTICES 157-63 (1937). This theory
is based on analogous reasons given by the l.C.J. in the Advisory Opinion on Southwest
Africa, International Status of Southwest Africa 1950 I.C.J. 131 (Advisory Opinion of July
11), in which the Court stated that the obligations of the mandate over that territory were
still in force notwithstanding the dissolution of the League of Nations. Id. See Rostow, Palesti-

nian Self Determination: Possible Futures for the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine
Ma.ndate, 5 YALE STUD. WRLD Pue. ORD. 147-72 (1979). Other authors conclude that under
international law, sovereignty is currently vested in Israel. If this were true, the territorial
sea of the Gaza Strip would extend to a breadth of 6 miles. See, e.g., J. STONE. ISRAEL AND
PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 155 (1981). In the treaty of peace between the
Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, the boundary between the two states if
fixed, "without prejudice to the issues of the status of the Gaza Strip." Treaty of Peace
Between the Arab Republk of Egypt and the State of Israel, done Mar. 26, 1977, reprinted
in 18 l.L.M. 362 (1979).
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Gibraltar has a three mile limit'1 and Lebanon has not yet claimed
any of the seas along its coasts.'2 In spite of these variations, recent
trends in the international community enable one to conclude that
coastal states are allowed to establish the breadth of their territorial
waters up to a limit of twelve nautical miles.'3
The present inquiry will deal specifically with the methods
adopted by the coastal states of the Mediterranean basin to fix the
baselines for measuring the breadth of their territorial seas." To
begin with, it must be remembered that during the 1951 Fisheries
Case the International Court of Justice underlined the fact that
"[a]lthough it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a

40. Law No. 2674 of May 20, 1982 concerning Turkish territorial waters has been unofficially translated by the Turkish Embassy, Washington, D.C. as follows: "The Council of
Ministers is empowered to determine territorial waters at an extent greater than six miles
for certain seas in accordance with relevant peculiarities and circumstances of those seas
as well as with the principle of equity." In compliance with this provision, the Turkish Council
of Ministers adopted on May 29, 1982 Decree No. 8/4742 which states:
Regarding the extent of territorial waters in the Black Sea and Mediterranean
Sea, the Council of Ministers, on May 29, 1982, in conformity with the power
specified in Law No. 2674 of May 29, 1982, and taking into account the peculiar
characteristics of the seas which surround Turkey and of the principle of equity
has decided that the situation which obtained before promulgation of this law will
be continued.
It is worth remembering that Article 2 of Law No. 476 of May 15, 1964 provided that, "[i]n
relation to States whose territorial sea is of greater breadth, the breadth of Turkey's territorial sea shall be determined in accordance with the principle of reciprocity." See UNITED
NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1974), supra note 31, at 128. Likewise, it should be stressed that
at present, on the basis of a Greek and Turkish territorial sea of 6 nautical miles, "only
three patches of the Turkish coast off the Anatolian plateau extend to the full 6 miles as
being affected by median line reduction." C.R. SYMMONDS, THE MARITIME ZONES OF ISLANDS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (1979).
41. The problem of the territorial sea of Gibralter is highly complex and will be
examined in Part II of this study. As far as the breadth of the territorial waters of Gibralter
is concerned, however, it can be said that generally reference is made to the rules in force
for the United Kingdom (3 miles). See P.C. JESSUP. supra note 3, at 10.
42. See LIMITS IN THE SEAS, s~pra note 22, No. 36 (1981) at 117. See also A.A. EL-HAKIN,
THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES ANDTHE LAW OF THE SEA 7 (1979); MacLean,Arabs and the Sea,
MED. ARAB REP. 10-11 (1979).
43. See, e.g., Ferreira, The Role of African States in the Development of the Law of the
Sea at the Third United Nations Conference, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 89 (1979); V. SEBEK. 1
THE EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 339 (1977); Catfish, Les Zones Maritimes Sous Jurisdiction Nationale, Leurs Limites et Leurs Delimitation,
84 R.G.DR.INT.P. 74 (1980); B. CONFORTI. LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 189 (2d ed.1982). _
44. In this study, however, the problem concerning the legal status of the territorial
sea, the rights the coastal state is entitled to exercise therein, and the rights of third states
in the territorial waters of the coastal state will not be examined. On these problems, see
N. PAPADAKIS. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1980).
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unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other states
depends upon international law." 45 Thus, it is useful to recall that
the method chosen to fix the baseline is fundamental in determining the legal status of the breadth of not only the territorial sea, 46
but also of the contiguous zone, 47 the exclusive economic zone 48 and
even perhaps the continental shelf. 49
The Mediterranean area is one which is geographically singular.
It has become a meeting point between not only North and South,
but also East and West. Further, it has always been a zone of
instability and frequent international crises. One only has to think
of the situation in Lebanon where there is permanent conflict
between the Arabs and the Israelis, and in Cyprus where there are
poor relations between Greece and Turkey. The Mediterranean is
bordered by states belonging to different international economic
and military organizations such as the European Communities,
N.A.T.O., the Arab League and the Organization for African Unity,
as well as by countries like Yugoslavia, which are traditionally NonAligned Countries.
Maritime traffic, encouraged by numerous well-equipped ports,
is flourishing and is an important voice in the economy of many
states in the Mediterranean, as is fishing. All this has contributed
to making even military control over this Sea decisive, which in
turn helps to explain the presence of both the United States and
the Soviet Na vies. so
In light of these considerations it is clear that each maritime
claim made by a coastal state bordering on the Mediterranean
assumes a particular importance. It is equally evident that given
45. Fisheries Case, supra note 5, at 132.
46. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 6; 1982 Convention, supra
note 8, art. 4.
47. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, sup l'a note 8. art. 24(2); 1982 Convention.
supra note 8, art. 33(2).
48. 1982 Convention, supra note 8, art. 57.
49. Id. art. 76(1) & (5). Cf Alexander, Baseline Delimitation s and Maritime Bow1daries,
23 VA. J. INT'L L. 503 (1982-83).
50. See c. GASTEYGER. Co~~f7ict and Tensfon in the Meditaranean. in INSTITl'TE OF
STRATEGIC STUDIES. ADELPHI PAPER No. 51 (1968); B. BADllRINA, lvfilitary Force in the Mediterl'anean. in THE TIDES OF CHANGE: PEACE. POLLllTION AND POTENTIAL OF THE OCEANS 197 (E.M.
Borgese & D. Krieger eds. 1975); Gasteyger, The Superpo1cers in the .iV!editerranea.n, 6 AN·
NALES D'ETUDES !NTERNATIONALES 41 (1975); J.W. LEWIS. THE STRATEGIC BALA'.'-JCE IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN (1976); B.M. BLECHMAN & S. KAPLAN. THE POLITICAL USE OF MILITARY POWER
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION (1977); Benchikh, La ~uer
Mediterranee. Mer Semi-Fennee, 84 R.G.DR.!NT.P. 284 (19801.
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these particular circumstances, the system for fixing the baseline
takes on a role of prime importance.
II. THE METHODS FOR THE DELIMITATION OF
TERRITORIAL WATERS ADOPTED BY THE STATES
FACING THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA
A. THE LOW-WATER LINE
Both the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 United Nations
Convention state that "the normal baseline for measuring the
breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast
as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal
State." 51 Although the wording of this rule seems quite clear, it
creates some problems. One of these problems concerns an exact
definition of the "low-water line." At the time of the 1958 Convention, the International Law Commission was on record as having
stated that, "[t]he traditional expression 'low-water mark' may have
different meanings; there is no uniform standard by which States,
in practice, determine this line." 52 Thus, during the 1958 Geneva
Conference some suggestions were made to clarify the definition
of "low-water line." 53 These suggestions, however, were overlooked
to avoid an over-rigid definition. It was, however, stated that in
view of differing state practice in the determination of the low-water
line, "ii existe done des lignes de basse mer et non une laisse de
basse mer," 54 since "la definition de la laisse de basse mer ne se
trouve pas en droit international, mais seulement dans les legislations nationales." 55
Uncertainty over the exact definition of the "low-water line"
does not usually lead to appreciable differences in the extension
of territorial waters. Such uncertainty, however, might cause confusion over the fixing of the baseline where two states have coasts

51. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 3; 1982 Convention, supra
note 8, art. 5.
52. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
53. The French delegation, for example, proposed to supplement that expression with
the words, "or isobath zero with reference to the datum sounding line." I UNCLOS III
OFFICIAL RECORDS (1975), supra note 25, at 212.
54. Voelckel, supra note 20, at 823.
55. Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 38. The necessity for a more precise definition of the
low-water line criterion has been emphasized by others, as well, see A.L. SHALOWITZ. 1
SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 212-13 (1962); M.I. GLASSNER & M. UNGER. supra note 39, at 305.
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opposite each other. In these circumstances, it might be difficult
to determine the boundary of the median line, where every point
is equidistant from the nearest point of the baseline from which
the territorial waters of the opposite state are measured. 58 Were
such a situation to exist, delimitation of the territorial sea between
the states concerned would have to be arranged by agreement.
Of all the states facing the Mediterranean, four have officially
fixed their baselines according to the low-water line rule. Some of
these states had little choice. The coasts of Monaco 57 and Israel58
are not deeply indented and cut into, nor is there a fringe of islands
along the coast in its immediate vicinity. In this respect the case
of Israel is also a good example. "The Mediterranean coast of Israel
is quite regular, having only one indentation, Haifa Bay, formed
largely by the promontory of Mount Carmel jutting into the sea." 59
The prerequisites for using the straight baseline method do,
however, probably exist for other states, such as Greece 60 and
Cyprus. 61 The coastlines of these states are deeply indented and
cut into. Also, there is a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity
of Greece. The decision taken by these states, however, to fix the
baseline along the low-water line is still in perfect conformity with
Article 3 of the 1958 Geneva Convention and with Article 5 of the
1982 Convention. Use of the straight baseline method is, in fact,
simply a possibility and cannot be considered as compulsory. 62
56. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 12; 1982 Convention,
supra note 8, art. 15. See infra text accompanying notes 157-78.
57. Ordonnance Souveraine No. 5.094, supra note 33.
58. Territorial Waters Law, supra note 39, art. 2.
59. M.I. GLASSNER & M. UNGER, supra note 39, at 304. Article 2 of the Israeli Territorial
Law states that:
Wherever it is said in any law that a part of the open sea adjoining the coast of
the State is included in the territory of the State or that any law or a power under
any law applies to such part, and the extent of that part is not fixed at less than
six nautical miles from low water mark or from some other point on the coast,
such extent shall be six nautical miles as aforesaid.
UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1974), supra note 31.
60. Law No. 230 of September 17, 1936, supra note 38, .art. 1. Failing specific rules,
it can be affirmed that the principle of the low-water line should also be applied to the
numerous islands under Greek sovereignty. On Greek legislation concerning the law of the
sea, see Tenekides, supra note 2, at 696; Ivrakis, Observations on the Legal Protection of the
Minera.l and Biological Resources of the Sea Beyond the Territorial Waters of Greece, 12 REVUE
HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.HELL.DR.INT.] 227 (1959); Papacostas, La Mer Territoriale et la Zone Contigue, 14 R.HELL.DR.INT. 166 (1961).
61. Territorial Sea Law, supra note 27, art. 3.
62. In fact, Article 4(1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention as well as Article 7 of the 1982
Convention provide that, "[t]he method of straight baselines ... may be employed (emphasis
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Although Lebanon has no specific legislation regarding the
limits of her territorial sea,63 some related laws have been created
for special purposes, such as fishing or customs. 64 The baseline for
these limits is always the coast or the line of low tide. The Lebanese
coast is in general quite regular, which partly explains the choice
of the low tide line.
Apart from the states mentioned above, there are others which
have adopted the low-water line system officially. These states are
Malta, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Gibraltar. The Moroccan law
of 1973, however, which extended the breadth of the territorial
waters to twelve nautical miles, 65 also reserved the actual fixing
of the baseline to a later date. To date, no Decree establishing a
baseline has been enacted.66 Since, then, it is impossible to determine the straight baselines, it is the low-water line which should
be considered the baseline of the territorial sea of Morocco.
The reason for Morocco's failure to enact baseline legislation
is perhaps due to the particular geographical position of Morocco
and to the problem of the "Spanish presidios" (Ceuta and Melilla)
and the Spanish islets near the Moroccan coast. 67 Faced with these
added)." 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 4(1); 1982 Convention,
supra note 8, art. 7. For similar views see S. LACLETA MUNOZ, Aguas Interiores y Bahia..~.
in 1 LA ACTUAL REVISION DEL DERECHO DEL MER: UNA PERSPECTIVA ESPANOLA 214 (197 4); Adam,
Un Nuovo Provvedimento in Materia di Linee di Base del Mare Territoriale Italia.no, 61
RIV.DIR.INT. 471-72 (1978).
63. See supra note 42.
64. The Fisheries Order of November 14, 1921, No. 1104, issued by France (Lebanon
was still under French mandate) limited the territorial sea of Lebanon to a breadth of 6
miles for fishing purposes. UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1974), supra note 31, at 524.
The Penal Code, enacted by Legislative Decree No. 340/NI of March 1943, extended the
territorial sea, for jurisdictional purposes, to a distance of 20 kilometers. Id. at 344. The
Customs Code, enacted by Law No. 422 of June 30, 1954, permits .customs officers to visit
all ships which sail within 20 kilometers of the coast of Lebanon. Id. at 177.
65. Law No. 1-73-211, supra note 34, art. 1. This law also established a 70 mile exclusive
fishing zone. In this zone, "(l]'exercise des droits de peche est maritimes reserve ... aux
bateaux battant pavillion marocain ou exploites pas des personnes physiques ou morales
marocaines." Id. art. 5. For a discussion of the importance for Morocco of the 1973 fishing
law, see Statement of Mr. Azzou, in LE DROIT MARITIME MAROCAIN. TRAVEAU DES JOURNEES
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT MARITIME MAROCAIN 171 (1981).
66. See Bardonnet & Carroz, Les Etats de l 'Afrique de l 'Ouest et le Droit International
des Peches Maritimes, XIX AN.FR.DR.INT. 844 (1973). The Moroccan coastline is, however,
regular and there are no inlets of considerable dimensions.
67. The question of the Spanish "Presidios" within the Law of the Sea was also raised
by Morocco during UNCLOS III giving rise to protests by Spain. Cf IV THIRD UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 75 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as IV UNCLOS III OFFICIAL RECORDS (1975)).
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difficulties it is highly possible Morocco avoided adopting a
unilateral law and that she preferred to negotiate a solution. In such
a situation the only possible baseline third states can use to measure
the Moroccan territorial waters is that of the low-water line.
Malta presents a similar problem. Article 3(1) of the Maltese
Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Act states that except "as
hereinafter provided, the territorial waters of Malta shall be all
parts of the open sea within 12 nautical miles of the coast of Malta;
measured from the low-water mark and the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points." 68 This Maltese document is
couched in rather obscure terms. It is possible, however, to state
that in the absence of more precise indications to concretely
establish straight baselines, the baseline of the territorial waters
of Malta is given by the low-water mark.
Algeria's legislation is a unique case which deserves to be
examined separately. Decree No. 63/403 of October 12, 1963 fixes
the breadth of Algeria's territorial waters but does not mention
the nature of the baseline from which this distance is to be
measured. 69 For reasons already mentioned, 70 however, it seems
reasonable to say that the low-water line along the coast of Algeria
is to be considered the baseline from which Algeria's territorial sea
is to be measured.
The problem posed by the territorial waters of Libya is identical to that posited above related to Algeria. Act No. 2 of February
18, 1959 concerning the delimitation of the Libyan territorial sea 71
gives no indication as to the baseline. As in the case of Algeria,
then, it must be supposed that the low-water line is the baseline
of the Libyan territorial waters. 72
68. Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Act, as amended, UNITED NATIONS
LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1980), supra note 32.
69. Decree No. 63-403 of October 12, 1963, supra note 26. For a comment on the particular rules concerning Algerian territorial waters, see Bendeddouche, Note sur la

Reglementation Algerienne du Passage et du Sejour des Navires de Guerre Etrangers dans
les Eaux Territoriales et lnterieurs de l'Algerie, XI R.ALGER.S.JR.POL.EC. 461 (1974).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 1-50.
71. Act No. 2 of February 18, 1959, UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1974), supra
note 31, at 14.
72. It might be helpful to remember, on this point, that before the Act of February
18, 1959, the territorial sea of Libya stretched for six miles from the coast. See Note of
November 29, 1955 from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Libya, reprinted
in UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1974), supra note 31, at 32. As far as the problem of
the closing line of the Gulf of Sirte is concerned, see infra text accompanying notes 113-56.
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Finally, Gibraltar's territorial waters present a similar, but
more complex, problem. In the Treaty of Utrecht of July 1713,73
Article 10 sets no limits to British jurisdiction over the adjacent
waters in the bay or in the strait. The question of British territorial
waters around Gibraltar has been the origin of persistent tension
between the two states since 1713. Their positions are still highly
discordant, but in general a territorial sea belonging to Gibraltar
itself is recognized 7' by Britain as well as others. 75 As there is no
special legislation on the question, the baseline for the territorial
waters of Gibraltar is given as the low-water line. 76

III. COMBINATIONS OF THE LOW-WATER
LINE AND STRAIGHT BASELINES SYSTEMS
The requisites for the use of straight lines baselines have been
discussed at length above. 77 It must, however, be noted that it is
unusual for a coastline to be deeply indented and cut into for the
entirety of its length, or for there to be a fringe of islands along
73. The Treaty of Utrecht, art. 10, reprinted in THE SPANISH RED BOOK ON GIBRALTER
155 (1965).
74. On this subject, the Spanish Royal Order of September 27, 1876 was considered
very important. It gave precise instructions to the commanders of the coastguard cutters
not to pursue smugglers within three miles east and south of the Rock. Although these instructions were in no way intended as Spain's recognition of British jurisdiction over the
waters in question, "[t]he 1876 Royal Order was interpreted by the Gibraltarians as a de
facto recognition of some type of British jurisdiction or control over the adjacent marine
areas in the Strait of Gibralter and Algericas Bay." s.c. TRUVER. THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTER
AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 173 (1980). See S. CONN. GIBRALTER IN BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1942); E. BRADFORD, MEDITERRANEAN: PORTRAIT OF A SEA (1971).
75. In this regard it is useful to remember the answer given, on November 14, 1967,
by the British Foreign Secretary who was asked, "[w]hat steps are being taken to prevent
the violation of British territorial waters off Gibralter by Spanish Warships." E. LAUTERPACHT, BRITISH PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1967). The Foreign Secretary replied,
"[u]nder international law Spanish and other warships enjoy the right of innocent passage
through Gibralter's territorial sea." Id. Previous to that comment, in May 1962, the Governor
of Gibralter remarked that, "[i]f the Spaniards seek to extend their [anti-smuggling] vigilance
to the whole of Algericas Bay, by entering British jurisdictional waters ... the British would
defend themselves by every means in their power." THE SPANISH RED BOOK ON GIBRALTER,
supra note 73, at 80. It is, however, worth remembering that the Spanish Law of January
4, 1977, supra note 35, contains a final provision according to which Spanish law, "is not
to be intended as a recognition of any rights or situations in connection with the waters
of Gibralter other than those referred to in art. 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht of 13 July 1713
between the Crowns of Spain and Great Britain." Id.
76. The Territorial Waters Order of 1964, which determines the straight baselines
of the territorial sea of the United Kingdom, makes no reference to the territorial waters
of Gibralter. E. LAUTERPACHT. supra note 75, at 49.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 10-21.
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the whole coast. Thus, it is unlikely for straight line baselines to
be appropriate in most cases. Under these circumstances, many
coastal states have determined baselines in turn by using the lowwater line in conjunction with the straight baseline system, according to the particular coastal situation. 78
The straight baselines system is rather difficult to apply due
to the vague wording of the rules derived from the conclusions of
the International Court of Justice in the 1951 Fisheries Case. 19 State
practice demonstrates that many of the Court's expressions in that
case have been used in the 1958 Geneva Convention interpreted
in many different ways. Some of those phrases most frequently
misinterpreted are that "the drawing of such baselines must not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the
coast," "the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters," as well as "account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region
concerned, the reality and the importance of which are Clearly
evidenced by long usage." 80
Albania and Spain are the two Mediterranean states which
have used the straight lines baselines system most widely. Albanian Decree No. 4650 of March 9, 1979, as amended in 1976,81
established a system of straight baselines departing from Cape
Rodoni and extending as far as the Greek boundary (through the
Straits of Corfu). A short section, from the estuary of the River
Bua (Yugoslav border) to Cape Rodoni seems to have the low-water
line as the baseline for determining the territorial sea. The 1976
Decree, however, does not stipulate any particular baseline along
78. 1982 Convention, supra note 8, art. 14.
79. Fisheries Case, supra note 5.
80. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, .supra note 8, art. 4(2) & (4); 1982 Convention, supra note 8, art. 7(3) & (5). See Gihl, The Baseline of the Territorial Sea, 11 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 119 (1967); Voelckel, supra note 20, at 820; L.M. ALEXANDER. Towards
an Objective Analysis of Special Circumstances, Bays, Rivers, Coastal and Oceanic A rchipel,agos
and Atolls, in THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE. OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 13; P. BEAZLEY. MARINE
LIMITS AND BASELINES: A GUIDE TO THEIR DELIMITATION (1977). To avoid similar problems, during the 1958 Geneva Conference, various proposals were made in order to regulate straight
baselines more closely. For example, according to a proposal presented by the United
Kingdom, the length of straight baselines should not exceed ten miles. I UNCLOS III
OFFICIAL RECORDS (1975), supra note 25, at 228. According to another proposal made by Italy,
"no point of the straight baselines should be more than five miles from the coast." Id. at 252.
81. Albanian Decree No. 4650 of March 9, 1970, supra note 25.
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this stretch of coast. Rather, in order to determine the exact
baseline, recourse must be had to the 1970 Decree.82 The seven
straight baselines pass from headland to headland, with the exception of a point on Sazani Island. The lines close two bays in conformity with the 1958 Geneva Convention, but close five others in ways
which do not conform to the 1958 Geneva Convention. 83 Nevertheless, these straight baselines meet the prerequisites discussed
above. It therefore seems possible to state that "this drawing of
straight baselines is in conformity with the existing law of the Sea."8'
Spain has drawn straight baselines along almost all of her
Mediterranean coastline. Article 2 of Act No. 10/1977 of January
4, 197785 states that "[t]he inner limit of the territorial sea shall be
determined by the low-water line and by such straight baselines
as may be established by the Government." A transitional provision in the above-mentioned Act states that "[t]he straight baselines
established by the Decree in implementation of Act No. 20/1967 of
April 8 shall constitute the inner limit of the territorial sea in
accordance with Article 2 of this Act, until such time as the Government exercises the powers conferred on it by that Article."
The Spanish Government has not yet enacted any such Decree.
Therefore, the straight line baselines for the delimitation of the
Spanish territorial sea remain those fixed for the implementation
of Act No. 20/1967 of April 8, 1967. These baselines were determined
by Royal Decree No. 2510/1977 of August 5, 1977.86 Thirty-nine
straight baselines have been drawn along the Mediterranean coast,
beginning at the frontier with Gibraltar and reaching to the border
of France. The baseline coincides with the low-water line in only
two stretches, one from Caho de Salou to Barcelona (the light) and
the other from Arenys de Mar (breakwater end) to Caho Bagur.
82. In reality, a straight baseline from the estuary of the Buna River and the Cape
of Rodoni was foreseen, but only in order to determine the internal waters.
83. Cf R.B. PRESCOTT, THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE OCEANS 92 (1975).
84. Ibler, supra note 25, at 178.
85. Act No. 10/1977 supra note 35. On the development of Spanish legislation concerning the territorial waters, see Ortega, Dercho de Pesca y Mar Territorial Espaiio, XVI
REVISTA ESPANOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL [R.ESP.DER.INT.] 61 (1963); de Azcarraga,
Espana Extiende a Doce Millas su Mar Territorial, XXII R.ESP.DER.INT. 332 (1969); Caro,
Delimitacion de las Agua Jurisdiccionales Espaiiolas, XXII R.EsP.DER.INT. 742 (1969); IDEM.
Mar Territorial: Naturaleza, Anchura e DelimitaciOn, in LA ACTUAL REVISION DEL DERECHO
DEL MAR. supra note 62, at 235; J.D. GONZALES CAMPOS, L.I. SANCHEZ RODRIGUEZ & A.S. DE
SANTA MARIA. 1 CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 458 (1983).
86. See 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LA w OF THE SEA. supra note 25, at 64.
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The straight lines connect points on headlands as well as points
on islands (such as the Islas Hormigas, Isla de Tabarca and Isla de
Portichol) which lie along the coast and in its immediate vicinity.
Although some bays were closed in contrast with the requirements
established in Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention (Article 10
of the 1982 Convention), it is to be presumed that their closing was
not based on the above-mentioned Articles. Rather, their closing
was a result of the adoption of the straight baselines system.87
Straight baselines were adopted to determine the baselines of
the Balearic Islands, some of which are completely surrounded by
straight baselines (Minorca, Ibiza and Formentera). For the island
of Mallorca, however, the low-water line is still the baseline between
Caho Formenton and Caho Llebeitx, where the coastline of the
islands is quite regular. There are no special provisions either in
Act No. 10/1977, or in Royal Decree No. 2510/1977 concerning the
territorial seas of the Spanish "enclaves" in Morocco (Ceuta and
Melilla), or the Spanish islands off the coast of Morocco. However,
since Article 2 of Act 10/1977 states that the inner limit of the
Spanish territorial sea shall be determined by the low-water line
and, where necessary, by straight baselines, it seems feasible to
suggest that the above-mentioned islands and "enclaves" have the
low-water line as the baseline for measuring their territorial waters.
For other states, the combined system of low-water line and
straight baselines has been much more clearly expressed in their
legislation. Egypt is a case in point. The Mediterranean coast of
Egypt is relatively featureless and without islands. Nevertheless
Article 5 of Royal Decree No. 180 of January 15, 1951 specifically
states the criteria by which the baselines of Egyptian territorial
waters are to be determined. 88 This rule raises some problems of
compatibility with the relevant international provisions because it
is not stipulated that the straight baselines must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. A glance
at the map, however, shows that in the Mediterranean at least this
problem does not arise. Major problems do arise from Article l(c),
which states that "[t]he term 'island' includes any islet, reef, rock,
87. See infra text accompanying notes 113-56.
88. Royal Decree of January 15, 1951 supra note 28. Article 6 of the Royal Decree
states that "the following are established as the baselines from which the coastal sea of
the Kingdom of Egypt is measured: (a) where the shore of the mainland or an island ....
Royal Decree of January 15, 1951, supra note 28, art. 6.
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bar or permanent artificial structure not submerged at lowest low
tide."
This definition of "island" given by the Decree departs from the
generally accepted rule that an island is a naturallyjormed area
of land, surrounded by water which is permanently above the highwater mark. 89 The differences are unequivocal and fundamental to
the drawing of straight baselines,• but it seems pointless to examine
the question any further since these rules have no bearing on the
Mediterranean coast of Egypt. 91
As previously mentioned, Law No. 37/1981 extended the Syrian
territorial waters to 35 nautical miles. One of the provisions of this
Law states that in case of conflict with other rules, Law No. 37 /1981
shall prevail. In the absence of other indications, it is to be considered that those baselines described in the previous legislative
Decree, No. 505 of December 28, 1963, are retained. This Decree
concerning the territorial sea of the Syrian Republic92 is nearly identical in concept to that of Egypt. An important difference is to be
seen, however, in the definition of "island." In the Syrian Decree
it is very close to that of Article 10 of the 1958 Geneva Convention.93
The Syrian coasts are rather different from those of Egypt,
inasmuch as there are some islands and shoals near to it" which
enable straight baselines to be drawn.95 Although, according to
89. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 10.
90. According the Royal Decree of Egypt, it would be possible, for example, for an
artificial island to have its own territorial sea. On this question, see generally Charles, Les
Iles Artijicielles, 71R.G.DR.INT.P.343 (1967); A.H.A. SooNs.Artificalislands and Installations
in International Law, in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE. OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 22 (1974).
91. Cf. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 22, No. 22.
92. See Syrian Law No. 37 (1981), supra note 24. As previously noted, the Government
of Syria decided, on September 9, 1981, to extend the breadth of its territorial sea up to
35 miles. Syrian Law No. 37, supra note 24. However, it does not appear that new baselines
have been fixed.
93. There remains, however, a substantial difference: the Syrian definition appears
to also include artificial islands which are excluded by the 1958 Geneva Convention. 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8.
94. Syrian law permits the enclosure of "shoals" within the internal waters of the state.
Syrian Law No. 37, supra note 24. Syrian Law No. 37 defines "shoals" as "every region
within the territorial sea, covered by shallow water, part of which remains covered with
water at the lowest level reached by the low tide." Id. According to Article 4(3) of the 1958
Geneva Convention, "[b]aselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless
lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level, have been built
on them." 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art 4(3).
95. Article 6 of the Syrian Decree allows, in special circumstances, for the extension
of the territorial sea. According to this article:
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Article 4 of the Syrian Decree, the straight baselines are to be
shown "on a large-scale map approved by the Syrian Arab
Republic," it has not been possible to obtain a copy of such a chart.
This makes it much more difficult to judge exactly how Syria has
applied the straight baselines system. The conclusions of
Geographer, U.S. State Department, are useful on this point. After
a close examination of the Syrian coast it was observed that "the
coastal features of Syria are limited in extent and in geographical
distribution. The total effect of the system, as a result, would be
relatively limited to the extension of the territorial sea." 96
The Turkish Act of May 20, 1982, concerning territorial
waters, 97 is considerably different from the Syrian Legislative
Decree. Article 3 declares that "[t]he breadth of territorial waters
will be measured from baselines to be determined by the Council
of Ministers." While Article 5 states that "[b]aselines which show
outer limits of internal waters and the breadth of the territorial
waters will be shown on large scale Naval maps prepared for this
purpose." No copies of these Naval maps are currently available.
However, by taking Decree No. 8/4742 adopted by the Turkish
Council of Ministers on May 29, 198298 into consideration, it is useful
to recall the situation present before the promulgation of the 1982
Law.
The Turkish coasts are, of course, deeply indented with only
a few islands in the North. Most of the Aegean islands are under
Greek sovereignty. The straight baselines, introduced by Law No.
476 of May 15, 1964, contain roughly 119 individual segments, which
do not depart appreciably from the general direction of the coast.
From the Greek boundary to Enez in the North and between Av
Burun and the Syrian frontier, the baseline is defined as the lowwater line.99
In case the measurement of the territorial sea according to the provisions of
this legislative decree leaves behind a region of high seas surrounded by the territorial sea from all sides and cannot be extended in any direction for a distance
of 12 nautical miles: this region is considered as part of the territorial sea as well
as any pocket that becomes prominent from the high seas and should be surrounded
by a drawing of one straight line not exceeding 12 nautical miles in length.
Syrian Law No. 37, supra note 24, art. 6.
96. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 22, No. 36 (1981).
97. Law No. 2674 of May 20, 1982, supra note 40.
98. See Decree No. 8/4742 of May 29, 1982, supra note 40.
99. A scale copy of the Turkish chart is reprinted in LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note
22, No. 36 (1981).
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The next Decree to be examined is the French Decree of
October 19, 1967. That Decree concerns straight baselines and the
closing of bays. 100 The wording of this Decree makes it extremely
difficult to distinguish straight baselines from lines closing bays
so that it is necessary to examine the Decree in its entirety. The
baseline of the continental Mediterranean coast will be considered
first. This baseline joins points on dry land, but also extends to
islands (e.g. Riou, Planier, Grand-Rouveau and Embiex). The straight
baselines do not depart appreciably from the direction of the coast
except for the section between the Toulon roadstead and Cavalaire
Bay, where there are some islands present. The low-water line is
the baseline for the most regular stretches of the coastline, for
example, between the Spanish border and the bay of Aigues-Mortes.
The straight baselines system is widely used for the waters around
Corsica on the west coast, but all along the east coast of this island
the baseline is given by the low-water line.
Tunisia too, has used a combination of the low-water line and
the straight baselines systems. Article 1(2) & (3) of Law No. 73-49,
of August 2, 1973101 provide that:
2. Les linges de base sont constituees par la laisse de basse mer
ainsi que par les lignes de base droties tirees vers les hauts fonds
de Chebba et des iles Kerkennah ou sont installees des pecheries
fixes, et par les lignes de fermeture des Golfes de Tunis et de
Ga hes.
3. Ces lignes de base seront precisees par decret.

This above Decree was enacted on November 3, 1973.102 The
low-water line is the baseline of the Tunisian territorial waters from
the Algerian border as far as Cap Sidi Ali El Mekki, from Cap-Bon
to Ras Kapudia, from Ras Turgueness to Sidi Garus and from Rar
Marmor to the Libyan border. The low-water line is also the baseline
for most of the islands (Fratelli, Cani, Pilau and Kuriates). Straight
baselines delimiting the permanent fisheries of Chebba and the
100. The Decree of October 19, 1967 is reprinted in 71 R.G.DR.INT.P. 1165 (1967).
Reference to these baselines can be found in Article 1 of Law No. 71-1060 of December 24,
1971, according to which, "the low-water line, the straight baselines and the closing lines
of bays, which are determined by Decree," constitute the baseline of French territorial waters.
Law No. 71-1060, supra note 29, art. 1.
101. See Law No. 73-49 of August 1973 supra note 36.
102. Decree No. 73-257 of November 3, 1973, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
TUNISIENNE 1697-98 (1973).
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Kerkennah islands go from Ras Kapudia to Samoun. Another segment unites Sidi Garous with Ras Marmor.
The Decree of November 3, 1973 provides for baselines closing the Bays of Tunis and Gabes, a point which will be dealt with
below .103 Here too, straight baselines unite points on dry land with
points on the islands. The straight baselines which enclose the
fisheries of Chebba and the Kerkennah islands do not follow the
general direction of the coast. It is interesting to note that Tunisia
regards these waters as historic waters. 10'
Italian legislation also presents several problems, both
domestic 105 (which will not be addressed here) and international.
Until 1977 the low-water line was the official baseline for Italian
territorial waters. 106 In 1977, however, a Presidential Decree fixed
new baselines. 107 Straight baselines were drawn along the Tyrrhenean coast of the peninsula in such a manner as to enclose the
Tuscan Archipelago as well as that of Ponza. The low-water line
prevails along the Adriatic coast although straight baselines are
drawn in the vicinity of the Gargano Promontory and in the north
around Venice and Trieste. The two largest islands, Sardinia and
Sicily, have straight baselines drawn around them to include the
smaller islands which are situated along their coasts.
Doubts have been expressed as to the legality of Italy's enclosing the Tuscan Archipelago. 108 Moreover, even stronger doubts have
been expressed regarding "the closure effected by the line, drawn
pursuant to the order, across certain gulfs and bays where the
distance in many cases exceeds the limit of 24 miles." 109 As far as
103. See infra text accompanying notes 113·56.
104. See Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab.·lamahiriya)
1982 I.C.J. 72 (Judgment of Feb. 24). Libya has always considered that those.fines are not
contestable by Libya. Id. at 75. See also Y.Z. BLUM. HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
241 (1965); A. SHUKAIRY. TERRITORIAL SEAS AND HISTORICAL WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1967); Goldie, Historic Bays in International Law: An Impressionistic Overview, 11 SYR. J.
INT'L L. & COM. 211 (1984).
105. Doubts have been expressed over whether the scope of such a statute is compatible with the Italian legal system. See Fusillo, Legislation, 3 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 572 (1977);
Adam, supra note 62, at 486: B. CONFORTI. supra note 43, at 193.
106. See Article 2 of the preliminary rules of the Italian Maritime Code of 1942, repri:nt,ed
in 57 RIV.DIR.INT. 859 (1974).
107. Decree No. 816 of April 26, 1977, reprinted in 3 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 570 (1977t
108. Adam, supra note 62, at 486. Cf Fusillo, supra note 105, at 572; B. CONFORTI, supra
note 43, at 193.
109. Fusillo, supra note 105, at 574.
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the conformity of the straight baselines around the Tuscan
Archipelago is concerned, it must be observed that were the
baseline to be fixed according to the low-water line, even according
to Article 5(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention the regime of the
waters around this archipelago would be very similar to that pursuant to the adoption of the 1977 Decree. However, the manner of
fixing the baseline around these islands (which has not provoked
official protests from other states) could be of particular significance
in the near future. As has previously been mentioned, the baseline
is not only the line from which the breadth of a state's territorial
waters is measured. It also delimits those areas of sea such as the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf which are of great
economic importance.
Finally, there are the laws of Yugoslavia. Straight baselines
were proclaimed by Yugoslavia on April 23, 1965,110 between Cape
Kastanjia in the north and Cape Zarubaca in the south. The total
length of these baselines, which consist of twenty-six segments, is
244.7 miles. Since there is a large number of islands nearby along
the coast, the straight baselines connect many of these islands as
well as several of tidal elevation. Each has a lighthouse as prescribed
by Article 4(3) of the 1958 Geneva Convention. 111 The low-water line
is still the baseline between the Italian border and Kastanija and
from Cape Zarubaca to the Albanian boundaries, as well as for the
two main Yugoslav islands, 0 Dugi Otok and Mljet.
This system of straight baselines was amended by a law
adopted on March 27, 1979.112 The innovation of interests for this
paper was the introduction of a new straight line, added to the
others, which joins Platamon to Mendra in the south of Yugoslavia.

IV. THE BASELINE OF THE TERRITORIAL
SEA WITHIN A BAY
The drawing of baselines in bays has always been a moot
point. 113 The main problems are the location and the maximum
extent of the closing line, and the rights of the littoral state on the
landward side of this imaginary line. The particular character of

110.
111.
112.
113.

See Law of May 22, 1962, supra note 37, art. 11.
See R.V. PRESCOTT, supra note 83, at 87.
See Law of March 27, 1979, supra note 37.
See, generally L.J. BoUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LA w (1963); M.P.

STROHL. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS (1963).
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the questions involved regarding bays leads us to consider them
separately further on.
For obvious reasons, state practice before 1958 will not be
discussed. 114 Rather, Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention is the
important point of departure. It is not by chance that Article 10
of the 1982 Convention reproduces, word for word, the text of
Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. This Article gives a definition of "bay ." 115 It also establishes the criteria for the closing-lines
of bays 116 and points out that of the provisions therein, neither apply to so-called 'historic bays,' [n]or in any case where the system
of straight baseline[s] ... is applied." This rule gives rise to delicate
problems. Apart from what is meant by "historic" bays, 117 the most
complex concern seems to be that of finding a relationship between
the straight baselines system (for which no limit in length is laid
down) and the closing line of bays (which must not exceed twentyfour nautical miles in length). 118 It has been rightly observed that
Article 7 of the Geneva Convention is a special rule, with a special
relationship to Article 4. 119 For this reason, where all the requisites
114. See Yates, International Law and the Delimitation of Bays, 49 N.C.L. REV. 943
(special ed. 1971).
115. Article 7(2) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea defines a bay as "a wellmarked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as
to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast." 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 7(2).
116. Articles 7(3), (4) & (5) set forth the criteria for the closing lines of bays as follows:
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between
the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the lowwater marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence of
Islands, as indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn
on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different
mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the
water area of the indentation.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of
a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between
these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered
as internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points
of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall
be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water
that is possible with a line of that length.
Id. art. 7(3), (4) & (5).
117. This paper will not examine the problem of "historic bays" deeply. On this argument see the other articles in this Symposium, 11 SYR. J. INT"L L. & COM. (1984).
118. Cf. Voelckel, supra note 20, at 827-28; Adam, supra note 62, at 474.
119. Cf. Ronzitti, Sommergibili non Identificati, Pretese Baie Storiche e Contromisure
Dello Stato Costiero, LXVI Riv. DIR. INT. 36 (1983). This interpretation, as the author points
out, is based on the preparatory works of the 1958 Geneva Convention.
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laid down in Articles 4 and 7 exist, the coastal state may draw a
closing line as well as a straight baseline.
Naturally, the consequences of each choice differs when the
baseline has been drawn following Article 4 as opposed to when
it has been drawn following Article 7. 120 In the first instance,
according to Article 5(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention, a right
of innocent passage will continue to exist in those waters, while
in juridical and historic bays no such right exists for foreign ships.
An examination of state practice shows that coastal states do
not always make this distinction clearly. It is rarely specified which
of the two criteria have been used for the delimitation of national
territorial waters. This makes interpretation particularly difficult
and leads to uncertainty over the navigational regime in some sea
areas, which might give rise to situations of international tension.
Considering the rules contained in the national legislation of
states bordering on the Mediterranean, it is clear some rules present no problem. This is because the low-water line is often the
baseline (e.g. Cyprus, Israel and Monaco), even in the presence of
bays.1 21 Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention leads to the conclusion that closing-lines for bays are merely a choice open to the
states involved. Nevertheless, wherever these states have not proceeded to draw a closing-line, the baseline shall be given by the
low-water line along the coast.
Other states whose baselines are the low-water line as well,
have adopted special rules for the baselines in bays. Morocco is a
case in point, as well as Algeria, Greece and Libya. The rules
governing the baselines in Morocco and Algeria have already been
examined. 122 It must be noted for Morocco, however, that a Dahir
of June 30, 1962123 provides for bays to be closed by "une ligne droite,
tiree en travers de la baie dans la partie la plus rapprochee de
l'entree, au premier point ou l'ouverture n'excede pas 12 milles,"
although there is no precise definition of what constitutes a bay.
120. Cf id. at 37.
121. Along the coast of Cyprus there are many bays, such as Khrysokou Bay, Morphou
Bay, Famagusta Bay, Larnaca Bay, Akrotiri Bay, and Episkopi Bay which do not correspond
to the definition given in Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva C~nvention . 1958 Convention
on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 7. Many bays in Malth, however, do appear to correspond to Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention: Mellieha Bay, St. Paul's Bay, Salina
Bay, St. George's Bay, St. Julian's Bay. Id.
122. See :,-upra text accompanying notes 65-72.
123. Decree No. 1-59-064 of 27 Moharrem 1382 (1962), re-printed in Rousseau, Chron'ique
des Fait Internationaux, 61 R.G.DR.INT.P. 181-82 (1963). The Moroccan coastline is quite
regular. Excluding the promontory of Melilla, only Athucemas Bay is not a juridical bay.
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On July 9, 1888, while Algeria was still a French Colony, France
enacted a Presidential Decree which caused the closing of many
of the gulfs of Algeria. 124 The largest closing line is ten miles long, 125
while the others are shorter. Apart from considering whether or
not this Decree is still in force, it should be noted that in general
the bays mentioned in the Presidential Decree cannot be considered
historic bays under Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. It
must also be observed that the application of closing lines has been
carried out with moderation. In some places, the closing line does
not even join the natural entrance points of the bay, but rather
points situated inside the bay. 126
Turning now to Greece, it should be noted that the Greek
baseline must be considered separately. As previously mentioned,
Law No. 230, of September 17, 1936 provides that the breadth of
the Greek territorial sea is to be measured from the coast. 121 Law
No. 4141 ·of March 26, 1913, which concerns passage and sojourn
of merchant vessels along the Greek shores, 128 contains provisions
which are different. This law provides for gulfs or bays, the entrance
of which does not exceed twenty miles in width, to have a baseline
which is "a straight line drawn across the seaward limit of the gulf
or bay ." 129 The upper limit of the closing line provided for by this
law (which is only applicable in times of war),1 30 is therefore less
than that established by Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. 131
It has also been mentioned that in Libya, Act No. 2 of February
18, 1959, concerning the delimitation of Libyan territorial waters,
gives no indications as to the baseline. 132 In fact, the Libyan coast
is neither indented nor cut into, unless one considers the Gulf of

124. See UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF
THE TERRITORIAL SEA. U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, at 16 (1957) [hereinafter cited as UNITED
NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1957)].
125. See, for example, the Bay of Sidi-Merouan, the Gulf of Bone, the Bay of Bougie,
the Bay of Algerie.
126. See, for example, the closing line of the bay of Oran.
127. See Law No. 230 of September 17, 1936, supra note 38.
128. See Law No. 4141 of March 26, 1913, supra note 38.
129. Law No. 4141, supra note 38, art. 1(1).
130. Cf L.J. BOUCHEZ. supra note 113, at 63.
131. However, given that a definition of bay was not given, and that Greece has not
ratified the Convention, it is quite possible that the closing of some Greek bays is not in
conformity with Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea, supra note 8, art. 7. In this case, moreover, the closing of similar bays could eventually
be justified in light of Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. Id. art. 4.
132. See Act No. 2 of February 18, 1954, supra note 31.
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Bunbah (near Tobruk), which is definitely not an historic bay. Nevertheless, in 1973 Libya declared the Gulf of Sirte to be "under its
complete national sovereignty and jurisdiction in regard to
legislative, judicial, administrative and other aspects related to ships
and persons that may be present within its limits." 133
The next issue to be examined is how those states, which have
adopted the system of straight baselines, have disciplined the closing
of bays. Legislation on the part of Albania, France, Italy, Spain and
Yugoslavia is emblematic. Albania has provided for a series of
straight baselines which cover most of her coasts. 134 There are
several bays and gulfs along it, like the Gulf of Vlones. These seem
to be covered by the definition of a bay given in Article 7 of the
1958 Geneva Convention. The natural entrance of these gulfs is inside the baseline. Thus, the rules governing the waters of this gulf
are eventually those provided for in Article 5(2) of the 1958 Geneva
Convention concerning the right of innocent passage for third state
vessels. 135
In France, the Decree of October 19, 1967 fixed the straight
baselines as well as the closing-lines of bays. 136 There are several
gulfs and bays along the French Mediterranean coast, but only a
few of them seem to respond to the requisites laid down in Article
7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. According to the above Decree,
lines are drawn to close the Gulfs of Aigues Mortes, Saintes Maries,
Fos, Saint Tropez, Frejus and Juan, and the Bays of Sanary,
Cavalaire, Pampelonne, Anges, Beaulieu and Roquebrune. This
Decree, however, fails to define the rules according to which these
bays and gulfs were closed. 137 Moreover, as the navigational regime
in some of these gulfs is not well-defined, it seems that the right
of innocent passage should be granted to all foreign ships where
Article 5(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention is applicable.
Most of the conclusions posited above also apply to Italy.
133. See UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES. NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES
RELATING TO THE LA w OF THE SEA. U .N. Doc. ST /LEG/SER.B/18, at 26 (1976) (hereinafter cited
as UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1976)).
134. See supra note 25 and text accompanying notes 82-85.
135. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art 5(2).
136. See Decree of October 19, 1967, supra note 100.
137. Article 1 of the Decree of October 13, 1967 states that "[l]es lignes de base droites
et les lignes de fermeture des baies servant la determination des lignes de base partir
desquelles est measuree la largeur des eaux territoriales sont tracees comme ii est indique
ci-apres ...." Decree of October 13, 1967, supra note 100, art. 1.
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Numerous bays and gulfs which cannot be defined as juridical were
closed following the Presidential Decree of 1977 .138 As the French
Decree before it, the Italian Decree does not specify according to
which Article of the 1958 Geneva Convention the various segments
of the baseline were drawn. 139 The Italian Decree defines the Gulf
of Taranto as being "historic." The problems raised by this definition, however, will not be examined here. 140
Spanish Royal Decree No. 2510/1977, of August 5, 1977 141 also
does not make a distinction between lines closing bays and straight
baselines. There are indeed many gulfs along the Spanish Mediterranean coasts, such as Almeria, Cartagena, Alicante and San Jorge
which, though they do not conform to Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention, have been closed by straight baselines. 142
As noted earlier, the straight baselines system determines most
of the baselines for Yugoslav territorial waters. No special provisions are made for the waters falling within these straight baselines.
Article 11 of the Law on the Coastal Sea Zone and the Epicontinental Belt of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as
amended in 1979,143 states that the baseline of the territorial waters
is given by the low-water line, by straight baselines and by "straight
lines closing the entrance[s] to bays." 1" Although no limit is set to
the length of these closing lines, it could be supposed that they come
into play in that part of Yugoslavia, beyond Zarubaca Point in the
south, where no straight baselines have been drawn. There is at
138. Presidential Decree No. 816 of April 26, 1977, supra note 107. For example, in the
Tyrrhenian Sea, the Gulf of Gioia and the Gulf of Eufemia, have been closed by the segments
Scilla Lighthouse-Cape Vaticano shoal reef and Cape Cozzo-River Savuto, respectively.
In Sicily, the Gulf of Castellamare has been closed by the segment Punta di Solanto- Punta
Raisi. Finally, the Gulf of Cagliari has been closed by the segment southern Isolotti- Isolotto
S. Macario.
139. Article 1 of the Italian Decree provides only that, "(t]he straight baselines and
lines closing natural or historic bays for determining the baselines for calculating the extent
of the Italian territorial sea shall be drawn as follows . . .." Id. art. 1.
140. On this question, see Ronzitti, supra note 119, at 5.
141. See Spanish Royal Decree No. 2510/1977 of August 5, 1977, supra note 86.
142. These bays have been closed by the segments, Punta del Sabinal-Punta Baja,
Caho Tinoso-Cabo de Agua, Isla de Tabarca-Cabo de las Huertas, and Caho TortosaCaba de Salou, respectively.
143. See Law of March 27, 1979, supra note 37, art. 11.
144. According to Article 3(2) of the Yugoslav law, a "bay" is defined as, "a distinctly
limited inlet recessed into the land and of a sea area equal to or larger than the area of
the semi-circle with a diameter equal to the length of the straight line closing the entrance
into the inlet." Law of March 27, 1979, supra note 37, art. 3(2).
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least one bay in this zone (near Boka Kotorska) to which Article
11 of the above-mentioned law could be applied. 145
In contrast to most other national legislations, Turkish Law
No. 2674, of May 20, 1982, concerning its Territorial waters,1 46 makes
no special provisions regarding closing-lines for bays. 147
The Tunisian coasts are fairly regular, with the exception of
the Gulfs of Tunis and Gabes. Closing lines have been drawn across
both of these Gulfs. 148 This decision by Tunisia raises special
problems concerning most specifically the Gulf of Tunis (with its
23-mile wide entrance). Tunisia has laid precise historical claims to
these waters, the examination of which falls outside the scope of
the present paper .149
Finally, the decisions of Egypt and Syria remain to be
examined. Article l(b) of the Royal Decree of January 15, 1951 concerning the territorial waters of the Kingdom of Egypt 150 states that
"[t]he term 'bay' includes any inlet, lagoon or other arm of the sea,"
while Article 6 of the same Decree asserts that "[t]he following are
established as the baselines from which the coastal area of the
Kingdom of Egypt is measured: ... b) where a bay confronts the
open sea, lines drawn from headland to headland across the mouth
of the bay."
This provision raises several problems. In the first place, the
definition of bay is vague; there is no requirement that the bay have
a reasonable penetration inland in proportion to its width. Moreover,
there is no definition of the size of the gulf. On the basis of this
Decree, which has been officially criticized by the United Kingdom
and the United States,151 many Egyptian bays in the Mediterranean
could be closed. 152 Placing aside the problem of the El-Arab Gulf,
which is considered by Egypt to be an "historic" bay, 153 none of these
145. See Law of March 27, 1979, supra note 37, art. 11.
146. See Turkish Law No. 267 4 of May 20, 1982, supra note 40.
147. In Turkey, there are various bays which are not in conformity with the semi-circle
rule. See, e.g., Kerme Bay, Fethiyex Bay, and Izmir Bay.
148. See Decree No. 73-257 of November 3, 1973, supra note 102.
149. On this point see L.J. BoucHEZ, supra note 113, at 222-23; Barrie, Historic Bays, VI
COMP. & INT'L L. J. S. AFRICA 53 (1973); Continental Shelf, supra note 104, at 53.
150. See Royal Decree of January 15, 1951, supra note 28, art. l(b).
151. The text of the British protest is reprinted in 7 R.EGYPT.DR.INT. 91 (1951). The
American protest appears at id. at 94.
152. For example, The Gulf of Salum (45.4 miles), Abu Hashaifa Bay (31.6 miles), El-Arab
Gulf (94.7 miles), the Bay of Pelusium (49.3 miles) and the Bay of El-Arish (65.0 miles). See
11 R.EGYPT.DR.INT. 205 (1955). Cf. A.A. EI-HAKIN. supra note 42, at 9.
153. The Egyptian government made the following statement in 1926: "According to
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bays meet the semi-circularity requirement of Article 7 of the 1958
Geneva Convention. 154
The definition of "bay" given in Legislative Decree No. 304 of
December 28, 1963, concerning the territorial sea of the Syrian Arab
Republic 155 is considerably different from that contained in the
Egyptian Decree mentioned above. According to the Syrian Decree,
the term "bay" means a "pronounced curve which has a depth in
relation to the width of its mouth so as to encompass water
surrounded by land. 15Sa The curve is not considered a curve unless its
area should be equal or more than half a circle circumscribed within
the mouth of that curve. 155b "Nevertheless, the maximum length of
the closing line of the bay is not defined. Article 5(b) of the Syrian
Decree states that the baseline fQr the measurement of the territorial sea in the bays is fixed as "lines to be drawn at one point
of the land from the entry of the bay to the other point." 155c
No great problems arise from the absence of a maximum limit
to the extension of closing-lines of bays. By looking at the map, it
can be seen that along the Syrian coast there should be no bay corresponding to the definition given in Article l(b) of the Syrian
Decree. 156

V. THE PROBLEM OF DRAWING BOUNDARY
LINES THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL SEAS
OF ADJACENT OR OPPOSITE STATES
Although only a recent activity of states, "the issues of
maritime boundary delimitation have been among the most contentious at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. This
is because boundary delimitation questions are not solvable by any
Egyptian public law, the breadth of the territorial waters is three miles, except as regards
the Bay of El-Arab, the whole of which is, owing to its geographical configuration, regarded
as territorial waters." Conference for the Codification of International Law: Territorial
Waters, League of Nations Doc. C.74 M.391929, at 125 (1927). In the British protest of 1951,
it was affirmed that along the Egyptian coast there are no historic bays. See British protest, supra note 151. On this point see also, L.J. BoucHEZ, supra note 113, at 220-21; M.P.
STROHL, supra note 113, at 258-61.
154. In consideration of the particular features of its own coastline, Egypt argued, during
the 1958 Conference, to exclude both the semi-circularity requirement and the 24-mile closing limit from Article 7. See 11 R.EGYPT.DR.INT. 203 (1955); 13 R.EGYPT.DR.INT. 70-71 (1957).
155. See Decree No. 304 of December 28, 1963, supra note 24.
155a. Id.
155b. Id.
155c. Id.
156. See LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 22, No. 53 (1973).
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one universally accepted formula." 157 The question was examined
in depth during the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea,158 at the conclusion of which the following Article was approved:
1. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent
to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea
beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from
the nearest point on the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply, however, where it is
necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances
to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which
is at variance with this provision. 159

The wording of this article makes quite clear the importance
of the exact determination of the baseline. It is also evident that
states which have adopted the straight baselines system will have
the advantage in determining the median line 160 over others which
have adopted the low-water line system. If one considers that no
two boundary situations are identical, and that the agreements
157. Smith, A Geographical Primer to Maritime Boundary-Making, 12 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 1 (1982). See H.D. HEDBERG. National International Jurisdictional Boundary on the
Ocean Floor, in LA w OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 16 (1972); voelckel, Aper~u
de Quelques Problem.es Techniques Concernant la Delimitation des Fronti£res Maritime, XXV
AN.FR.DR.INT. 693 (1979); N. WISNOEMOERTO. Delimitation ofMaritime Bm.tndaries: Its Problems
and Issues, in THE FRONTIERS OF THE SEAS: THE PROBLEMS OF DELIMITATION 46 (1981).
158. It is worth remembering that the International Law Commission, in its drafting
of proposed Law of the Sea texts, called upon a "group of experts" to settle how maritime
space should be divided between adjacent or opposite states. Those "experts" conclusions
are presented at (1953) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 77.
159. See A.L. SHALOWITZ, supra note 55, at 231;
DE VISSCHER, PROBLEMES DE CONFINS
EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 119 (1969); Hodgson & Cooper, The Technical Delimitation of
a Modern Equidistant Boundary, 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 361 (1974); Aede, Toward the For-

c.

mulation of the Rule of Delimitation of Sea Boundaries Between States with Adjacent or Opposite Coasts, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 207 (1979); Jagota, Maritime Boundary, 171 HAGUE RECUEIL
96 (1981-11). Article 15 of the 1982 Convention, supra note 8, art. 15, repeats the content
of Article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra
note 8, art. 12.
160. On this point it is worth remembering that during the 1958 Geneva Convention
Conference, Portugual made a proposal to replace the words "on the baseline from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each of the two States is measured" by the words "on
the low-water line along the coasts of those States." III THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LA w OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS (1975) [hereinafter cited as III UN CLOS III OFFICIAL
RECORDS (1975)). The purpose of this proposal was, according to Boavida, the Delegate of Portugual, "to simplify the procedure required and to enable mariners to draw the median line
on the charts without reference to the domestic law of the States concerned." Id. at 187.
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between the states concerned assume considerable importance, it
is to be presumed that in order to prevent future conflict, most of
the coastal states will have to enter into bilateral negotiations to
establish offshore boundaries. 161
With regard to the question of boundaries of territorial waters
of opposite or adjacent states, as yet only three specific agreements
have been concluded in the Mediterranean area. The first of these
agreements defines the territorial sea boundaries between the
Republic of Cyprus and the two United Kingdom Sovereign Base
Areas on the Island of Cyprus. 162 Although a precise determination
of the principles used by negotiators seems to be impossible, it can
be stated that the boundaries were not based on the equidistance
principle. Moreover, in each instance, the terminal limits to the sea
boundaries were not designated. 163
The second agreement for the delimitation of offshore boundaries concerns the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia, in the
Gulf of Triest. Article 2 of the Treaty between the two countries
signed at Osimo on November 10, 1975 declares that "[l]a frontiere
entre les deux Etats dans le Golfe de Trieste est decrite par le texte
a l' Annexe III et tracee sur la Carte a l' Annexe IV du present
Traite." 164 In the exchange of notes reproduced in Annex IV it is
stated that "[e]n procedant a la delimitation des eaux territoriales
dans le Golfe de Trieste, chaque partie a tenu compte des principes

161. Cf. Smith, supra note 157, at 2.
162. When Cyprus became independent in 1960, the United Kingdom maintained certain base areas on the island as sovereign "British Territory." Treaty Concerning Cyprus,
supra note 27, at 208, provided for territorial sea boundaries between the new republic and
the U.K. Sovereign Base Areas.
163. This was done, perhaps, in order to enable both parties to extend the breadth of
their territorial waters. See R.V. PRESCOTT, supra note 83, at 109. At present, the breadth
of the territorial waters of Cyprus is 12 nautical miles while that of the United Kingdom
seems to be 3 nautical miles. In fact the Treaty between the United Kingdom and Cyprus
describes British Sovereign Base Areas as British territory. Treaty Concerning Cyprus, supra
note 27, at 208. This has been confirmed recently by the British Minister of State, who wrote:
"The Sovereign Bases remained British territory when the rest of the island of Cyprus was
transferred to the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus under the Treaty of establishment.
The British Government continues to consider the 1960 Treaties as valid." Statement of
Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, July 8, 1980, LI BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 442
(1980).
164. Treaty of Economic Cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia, done Nov. 10, 1975,
119 GAZZ. UFF. ITAL. (Apr. 3, 1977). Italy ratified the treaty in 1977. See Law No. 73 of March
14, 1977, 77 GAZZ. UFF. ITAL. (1977).
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decoulant de la Convention de Geneve sur la mer territoriale et
la zone contigue du 29 avril 1958."
Relations between Italy and Yugoslavia have for a long time
been strained due to unresolved questions over the frontiers, dating
from World War II. It has been pointed out that in determining
the boundaries of territorial waters in the Gulf of Triest, political,
rather than juridical considerations carried more weight. 165
Apart from these two agreements over offshore boundaries
there is another between Italy and Turkey, concerning the delimitation of territorial waters between the coast of Anatolia on one side
and Castellorizzo and the nearby islands on the other. 166 These states
frequently utilized the concept of "median line" to determine their
respective territorial waters. 167 Italy ceded the full sovereignty of
Castellorizzo as well as the adjacent islands 168 to Greece, according
to the Treaty of Peace with Italy, signed at Paris on February 10,
1947.169
It does not seem, though, that any such relinquishment of
sovereignty should affect the boundary established by the Treaty.
One rule regarding this point is Article 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States on Respect of Treaties. The opinion
of a number of authors, however, also implies the existence of a
precise rule of general international law. 170 It can, therefore, be
deduced that Greece succeeded Italy in the Treaty stipulated
between this state and Turkey in 1932.171 For this reason the Agreement is still in force and continues to govern the limits of the territorial waters between Castellorizzo and the adjacent islets on one
165. See Florio, Problemi della Frontiera Marittima nel Golfo di Trieste, 60 Riv. DIR.INT.
483 (1977). In reality, there is another agreement which could be of some interest at this
point: the Convention between Italy and France for the Delimitation of the Fisheries Zone
between Corsica and Sardinia, done Jan. 18, 1908, 206 Parry's T.S. 171 (1980). The boundary
line is determined by two segments: one drawn between Guardia del Turco and Isola Budelli;
the other between Control do li Scala and Punta Marmorata. The agreement fixes the boundary line for the delimitation of the fishing zone only. Id.
166. Convention for the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters between the Coast of
Anatolia and the Island of Castellorizzo, done Jan. 4, 1932, 88 L.N.T.S. 244 (1933).
167. Id. art. 5.
168. Treaty of Peace with Italy, done Feb. 10, 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 3 (1950).
169. Id. at 126.
170. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 667 (3rd ed.1979).
171. On this point, see Statement of M. Halkiopoulos, reprinted in CoNSEIL DE L'EuROPE,
ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE, CONFERENCE PARLEMENTAIRE RELATIVE A LA CONVENTION DES
NATIONS UNIES SUR LE DROIT DE LA MER 7 (1984).
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side and the coasts under Turkish sovereignty on the other.
Apart from these three, there are no other specific agreements
over the delimitation of the boundaries of territorial waters of
opposite or adjacent states in the Mediterranean area. Most of the
national legislations concerning the territorial sea make no specific
ruling as to this problem. 112
Other legislation does, however, contain rulings governing the
boundaries of territorial waters of opposite or adjacent states. In
general terms, these laws declare that if the coastal sea of the state
concerned is overlapped by the coastal sea of another state, unless
otherwise stated in some particular Convention, the boundaries shall
be determined in accordance with the principles of international
law. 173 In a few cases it is stated that failing an agreement the
breadth of the territorial waters of the state concerned does not
extend beyond a median line every point of which is equidistant
from the nearest point on the baselines of the coast of the state
concerned and the baseline of the foreign coasts, opposite or
adjacent to the coasts of the state concerned. 174 It .is, therefore,
possible to establish the boundary line of the territorial seas
between opposite or adjacent states on the basis of these rulings.
This is true even failing specific agreements in cases at least where
there is no doubt as to the determination of the baselines concerned,
boundary lines may be established.
But how are the limits of the territorial seas to be established
between opposite or adjacent states when neither state has ad hoc
rulings in their national legislation? In the absence of specific
agreements between the states concerned, it has been affirmed that
172. See the national legislation of Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.
173. See Article 8 of the Royal Decree concerning the Territorial Waters of the Kingdom
of Egypt, supra note 28, and Article 7 of the Legislative Decree concerning the Territorial
Sea of the Syrian Arab Republic, supra note 24.
174. See Article 2 of the French Law extending French territorial waters to 12 miles,
supra note 29; Article 2 of the Moroccan Declaration of March 2, 1973, supra note 34; Article
4 of the Spanish Law concerning the Territorial Sea, supra note 35. Article 4 of the Spanish
Law states that the Spanish territorial sea shall extend beyond the median line only if the
baselines of states concerned were drawn "in accordance with international law." Id. The
Turkish Law No. 2674 of May 20, 1982, on the other hand, affirms that "Turkish territorial
waters with States which share adjacent or opposite shores will be delineated by agreement. This agreement will be made by taking into account relevant characteristics of the
region and circumstances and according to the principle of equity." Turkish Law No. 2674,
supra note 40.
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the limits will still be represented by the median line. If this were
not so it would be impossible to determine the territorial seas of
these states.
Considering the assertions of the International Court of Justice
in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Case,1 75 and considering
that only 5 states facing the Mediterranean, as well as the United
Kingdom, are parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention, it is possible
to affirm that the states concerned are entitled to fix the boundary
of their territorial waters by agreement with the opposite or
adjacent states. This gives the states the possibility of taking
"historic titles or other special circumstances" into account as foreseen by Article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention.
However, where no such special agreement exists, the boundary of the territorial seas of opposite or adjacent states shall be
the median line. This is in order to guarantee rights of passage to
those who sail the seas and who otherwise would not be able to
know the exact boundary line. It is interesting to note that Article
15 of the 1982 U.N. Convention confirms the fact that, in the absence
of agreement, the median line is to be considered as the boundary
line of the territorial seas between states with opposite or adjacent
coasts.
The baselines which serve to determine the position of the
median line shall be those fixed in the national legislations of the
states concerned, unless these baselines are objects of controversy.
When fixing the baseline of its territorial sea, each state may take
the geographical configuration of its coastline into account as well
as any historical titles which it may possess, or consider that it
possesses, to zones of sea near its coast. When the system used
to fix the baseline is not the object of official protests on the part
of other states (in particular of opposite or adjacent states), the
median line is traced through points equidistant from the baselines
of the states concerned.
Where claims are laid through specific historical titles by one
of the states, or where a state declares that a baseline has been
fixed in contrast with the rules of international law, it will be an
175. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J.
4 (Judgment of Feb. 20). The Court stated that as far as the delimitation of the continental
shelf of states with opposite or adjacent coasts was concerned, the use of the equidistance
method of delimitation is obligatory only between. parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention.
Id. at 53.
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extremely arduous task to determine the median line with exactness unless a specific agreement is reached. In this last case, only
an agreement between the parties concerned will enable the precise
determination of the boundary line through the territorial seas of
those adjacent or opposite states.
With the exception of incidents connected with the delimitation of "historic" waters or bays, 176 only some particular areas of
the Mediterranean have seen controversies or incidents stemming
from the delimitation of territorial waters of adjacent or opposite
states. Such incidents include disputes in the territorial waters of
Gibraltar, 177 fishing incidents involving Spain and Morocco, Italy and
Tunisia and Italy and Libya, and controversies between Turkey and
Greece concerning the delimitation of their territorial seas. 178 In all
the other cases where either express or de facto criteria of the
median line have been used to fix the boundary of territorial waters
of opposite or adjacent states, no incidents of any importance have
occurred through disagreement over the interpretation of this boundary line.
VI. CONCLUSION
In concluding this enquiry into the various laws of Mediterranean states concerning the delimitation of their own territorial
waters, some particularly interesting aspects will be emphasized.
First, it should be noted that in the Mediterranean area in recent
years there has been a general trend to fix the breadth of territorial
seas at a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles. To date only
Syria and Albania have fixed their limits at a greater distance
(thirty-five and fifteen nautical miles respectively). Extending the
breadth of the territorial waters to twelve miles raises problems
for navigation in the Mediterranean straits. 179
176. On the recent incidents in the Gulf of Sirte and the Gulf of Taranto see, Francioni, The Status of the Gulf of Si rte in International Law, 11 SYR.J .INT'L L. & COM. 311 (1984);
Ronzitti, supra note 119, at 5, respectively.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
178. This controversy has become more complex since Greece has started to examine
the possibility of extending her territorial waters to 12 miles. A like decision would ensure
Greece the control of 64% (instead of 35%) of the Aegean Sea. See C. ROUSSEAU. supra note
123, at 808. On the difficult relations between Greece and Turkey concerning the Law of
the Sea, see C.R. SYMMONDS. supra note 40, at 90, 137 & 172; D.W. BOWETT. THE LEGAL REGIME
OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1979).
179. For a geographical description of these straits, see R.H. KENNEDY, A Brief
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Leaving rulings contained in special treaties aside,1 80 it is
generally recognized that all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of
transit passage, which shall not be impeded through international
straits. 181 The rules for navigation through straits are, therefore,
different from the general rule on innocent passage through territorial seas. These rules are so different that while a coastal state
may temporarily suspend the right of innocent passage through
specified areas of its territorial seas, under particular
circumstances, 182 the suspension of transit passage for foreign ships
through straits is never permitted.
Geographical and Hydrographical Study ofStraits Which Constitute Routes for International
Traffic, in I UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 114 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as I UN CLOS OFFICIAL RECORDS (1958)]. See also Smith, An Analysis of the
Strategic Attributes of International Straits: A Geographical Perspective, 2 MARITIME STUDIES
AND MANAGEMENT 88 (1974).
180. In the 1958 Convention, the only reference to straits is found in Article 16(4): "There
shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are
used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of
the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State." 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea, supra note 8, art. 16(4). See R. LAPIDOTH, LES DETROITS EN DROITS INTERNATIONAL (1972);
Shyan, International Straits and Ocean Law, 15 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 17 (1975); Giuliano, The
Regime of Straits in General International Law, 1 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L.16 (1975). In the 1982
Convention, the whole of Part 3 (Articles 31-45) deals with straits. 1982 Convention, supra
note 8, arts. 31-45.
Specific rules deal with the navigation regime in the Strait of the Dardanelles. See Montreaux Convention, done July 20, 1936, reprinted in 173 L.N.T.S. 218 (1936-37). Article 1 of
the Montreaux Treaty provides for "freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits" and
declares that the exercise of that freedom shall henceforth be regulated by the provisions
of the Convention. Id. art. 1.
The problem of the Suez Canal, which is not a strait, is slightly more complex today
than when regulated by the Convention of Constantinople in 1888. See Convention of Constantinople, done Oct. 20, 1888, reprinted in J. A. OBIETA, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE
SUEZ CANAL 119 (2d ed 1970). According to Article 1 of the Convention of Constantinople, the
Canal "shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel
of commerce or of war without distinction of flag." Id. art. 1. In 1956, the Egyptian government nationalized the Canal Company but made no claim to change the international status
of the Canal itself. On April 24, 1957, Egypt made another statement according to which
she would, from then on, respect the obligation arising from the Convention of Constantinople. See de Visscher, Les Aspects Juridiques Fondamentaux de la Question de Suez, 62
R.G.DR.INT.P. 400 (1958); Dehaussy, La Declaration Egyptienne de 1957 sur le Canal de Suez,
VI AN.FR.DR.INT. 169 (1960); J.A. 0BIETA, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE SUEZ CANAL (2d
ed. 1970).
181. Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Greece) 1949 I.C.J. at 28 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
182. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 16(3); 1982 Convention,
supra note 8, art. 25. Cf. Oelofsen, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
Passage through Straits Used for International Navigation, 8 COMP. & INT'L L. J. S. AFRICA
367 (1975); A.O. PHARAND, VII INTERNATIONAL SRAITS, THESAURUS ACROASIUM 59 (1977).
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Another feature which distinguishes the rules governing
innocent passage through territorial seas from transit passage
through straits should be mentioned here. Submarines are required
to navigate on the surface and to show their flag only when they
are traveling through the territorial waters of a foreign country. 183
On this point it must be recalled that there are provisions which
have been made not allowing the existence of a sufficient zone of
high seas for navigation through such straits. In these circumstances
it has been forseen for example that "regulations may be issued
in order to insure a free maritime and aerial navigation, subject
to the provisions of international conventions, and, if need be, after
an agreement has been reached with the concerned State." 184
Greater problems arise, however, from the Albanian legislation,
according to which the waters of the Corfu Strait 185 -defined by
the International Court of Justice as an "international strait"188 -are,
considered "internal waters" and are, therefore, not subject to the
right of transit passage on the part of foreign vessels. 187 Other straits
exclusively within the limits of the territorial sea of one state, whose
legislation does not contain rulings expressly concerning navigation through straits, are to be considered as coming under the relevant rules of customary international law giving the right of
transit. 188
As far as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea is concerned, four states have officially adopted the
low-water line system (Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Monaco). The lowwater line also constitutes de facto the baseline for Algeria, Libya,
183. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 8, art. 16(3); 1982 Convention,
supra note 8, art. 20.
184. French Law No. 71-1060 of November 24, 1971, supra note 29. With this rule, France
intended to set an example for other states. Cf. Queneudec, supra note 29, at 768. Article
3 of the French Law concerns the Strait of Bonifacio, which separates Corsica from Sardinia.
French Law No. 71-1060 of November 24, 1971, supra note 29, art. 3. Article 3 of the Moroccan Law of March 2, 1973, supra note 34, art. 3, is modeled after French Law No. 71-1060.
The Morrocan law is particularly important as it was written specifically for navigation in
the Strait of Gibralter. Id.
185. Corfu Channel, supra note 181, at 29.
186. Albanian Decree No. 4650 of March 9, 1970, supra note 25, art. 4(2).
187. For a criticism of Albanian legislation in the field under discussion, see lbler, supra
note 25, at 191.
188. In the only navigable waterway to and from the Adriatic-the Straits of Otrantothere still exists quite a wide lane which has the status of high seas. See lbler, supra note
25, at 179.
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Malta, Morocco and Gibraltar. In nine states of the Mediterranean
area, however, the baseline is partly drawn as the low-water line
and partly by a system of straight lines; these states are Albania,
Egypt, France, Italy, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 189
The criteria for drawing these baselines are not always uniform
and the conditions laid down in Article 4(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention have been interpreted in several ways. In spite of this the
provisions concerning straight baselines have rarely been the object
of official protest from third states. 190
The practice of Mediterranean states shows considerable
divergence not only with respect to what is considered a bay, but
also with respect to the maximum length for the closing-lines of
bays. The term "historic bay" has also been subject to several
interpretations, depending on the requirements of the state concerned. This has given rise to some dangerous Incidents which could
have been the cause of international crises. Similar crises could have
come about through the uncertainty of the regime of navigation
in the waters of some bays, since it is impossible from the examination of the single national legislations to determine on the basis
of what principle the closing of the bays has been carried out. 191
The fact that the national legislation of some states-Albania,
Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Yugoslavia-provides a specific ruling
which establishes the internal waters, does not solve this problem.
This is because according to these rules, not only are the waters
of ports and bays considered internal, but also all those on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea. 192

189. In reality even Malta and Morocco officially adopted the straight baseline method.
But, for the reasons given previously, see supra notes 121-23, the low-water line has to be
considered the effective baseline in these states.
190. On this point it is worth recalling those authors who claim it would be permissible
to adopt measures which, while in contrast with the 1958 Geneva Convention, would remain
within the reasonable limits of tolerability. See generally Adam, supra note 62, at 489.
191. The national legislation which clarifies the navigational regimes on the landward
side on the closing lines of bays are: Tunisian Law No. 73-49, supra note 36, art. 2; Turkish
Law No. 2674, supra note 40, art. 4. According to both laws, the Gulf waters are considered
internal waters.
192. On this point it is uncertain whether third states' vessels continue to enjoy a right
of innocent passage in the waters considered internal by these legislations. Just because
the bays closed were not important for international navigation does not always answer
the question. Several of these bays, such as the Gulf of Taranto, are very important for
military or strategic reasons.
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The territorial seas of adjacent or opposite states have been
delimited by only three bilateral agreements. In most other cases
the boundary has either been fixed unilaterally by national legislation, or else it is fixed de facto. Although this means of fixing the
boundaries of the territorial sea has given rise to incidents because
of divergent interpretations of the boundary line, no particular difficulties have arisen in its actual application. It must also be stressed
that in some cases 193 it has been preferred, and it is still preferred,
to resolve the question of the limits of territorial seas by action
rather than to embark on bilateral negotiations which could have
or could still aggravate situations of international tension. 194
It must be added that in the near future the issue of the limits
of territorial seas, particularly between adjacent states, will become
more important. The consequences that derive concerning the
delimitation of the zones of sea, such as the continental shelf and
the exclusive economic zone, are of particular economic interest.
The trend of states to enlarge their sovereignty over increasingly
extensive areas of sea for economic but also for military reasons, 195
coupled with the small size of the Mediterranean Sea, makes the
delimitation of boundaries between territorial seas one of the most
delicate issues that the international community will have to face
in the near future. 196
193. See, e.g., the boundaries between Greece and

Turkey, Morocco and Spain, and Spain

and Gibralter.

194. Bardonnet & Carroz, supra note 66, at 844.
195. See Lawrence, Military-Legal Considerations in the Extension of Territorial Seas,
29 MIL. L. REV. 47 (1965); J.A. KNUAS. The Military Role in theOceananditsRelation to the Law
of the Sea, in SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 77 (1971); J.
GOLDBLAT. Law of the Sea and the Security ofCoastal States, in NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF
THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 301 (1975); 0.P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA
POWER (1975); G.G. ROSENTHAL, THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN, ITS POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CHANGING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1982); Abbadi, Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
Basin, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 55 (1984).
196. See R. JEANNEL. Les Procedes de Delimitation de la Frontiere Maritime, in SocIETE
FRANCAISE POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, COLLOQUE DE POITIERS 34 (1980).
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